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Abstract  
 
There is a close relationship between computational creativity in the arts 
and generative art. Prior work is summarized here as to how complexity 
theory can serve as a theoretical context for generative art.  This is 
extended to show how complexity theory can also illuminate discussions 
regarding computational creativity.   
 
Another prior proposal is also summarized. It suggests that a world-view 
called “complexism” can reconcile the current differences between the 
modern culture of science and the postmodern culture of the humanities.  
This line is also extended to considerations regarding computational 
creativity.  Particular attention is extended here to the issues of authorship, 
progress, and aesthetic measurement in computational creativity.  
 
Finally, under artistic license, I discuss some very speculative ideas regarding 
computational creativity that I explore in my current artwork.  
 
1. Definitions and Theories 
 
Some find a sense of intellectual security from the somewhat expected 
procedure of first defining terms and then proceeding with theoretical 
exposition.  In a usual academic context where there is a preexisting 
technical language that includes commonly accepted definitions this is good 
standard practice.   
 
However, in an unusual discussion that breaks existing paradigms1, crosses 
disciplines, and ultimately requires the invention of new language, it’s useful 
to remember that neither word meanings nor theory can stand alone. Both 
are rooted in the other and inseparable. It could well be that in a full 
                     
1 The difference here being similar to Kuhn’s notion of “normal science” and “extraordinary science.”  [1.] 
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account of computational creativity its definition will not be the first thing 
presented.  It may, in fact, be the last.  And that is the case here. 
 
II. Defining Generative Art via Complexity Theory 
 
Closely related to the topic of computational creativity in art is generative 
art.  It is, among other things, where those in the arts study and put to 
work presumed computational creativity.  And in the field of generative art 
some standardization of the language, and corresponding consensus around 
theory, has occurred.  But even within generative art there is controversy.  
Definitions, i.e. theories, of generative art in circulation include: 
 
• Generative art involves the use of randomization in composition. 
• Generative art involves the use of genetic systems to evolve form. 
• Generative art is art that is constantly changing over time.  
• Generative art is created by running code on a computer.  
 
In a previous paper [2] I introduced a theory of generative art that offered 
what is now likely the most widely cited definition of generative art.  In a 
more recent paper [3] I didn’t modify the underlying theory, but I did offer 
the following to disambiguate a few aspects of the previous definition: 
Generative art refers to any art practice where the artist cedes control to a system 
that operates with a degree of relative autonomy, and contributes to or results in a 
completed work of art. Systems may include natural language instructions, biological 
or chemical processes, computer programs, machines, self-organizing materials, 
mathematical operations, and other procedural inventions. 
This theory of generative art casts a very wide net that is independent of 
any particular past or future technology.  By including systems such as 
symmetry, pattern, and tiling, generative art is theorized to be as old as art 
itself.   
 
This view of generative art also includes 20th century chance procedures as 
used by Cage [4, 5], Burroughs [6], Kelly [6], Duchamp, and others.  Along 
with notions of symmetry, this helps to tightly bind generative art to the 
standard art canon rather than leaving it isolated as an awkward art world 
orphan.  
 
Next, if generative art turns on the use of systems, then the contemporary 
scientific program for the general study of systems, complexity theory, 
provides a context for the consideration of generative art.  In brief, 
scientists such as Murray Gell-Mann [7] classify simple systems as being 
either highly ordered or highly disordered, and hold that complex systems 
exhibit a dynamic tension between order and disorder.  This is sometimes 
called “effective complexity.” 
 
Figure 1 
 
The earliest forms of generative art, those noted above as involving 
symmetry, pattern, and tiling, exploit simple highly ordered systems.  In the 
20th century the use of chance procedures, i.e. randomization, introduced 
highly disordered systems in generative art.  Those interested in 
computational creativity in art tend to currently focus on generative art 
that involves complex systems such as genetic algorithms and evolution, 
artificial life, chaotic systems, emergent behaviour in networks, and so on. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
III. Modern Science Culture versus Postmodern Humanities Culture 
 
In any discussion of creativity, computational or not, both those in the 
humanities and the sciences will have contributions to make.  Many writers 
have commented on the current fundamental split in worldview we now 
find between the humanities and sciences, and this split will no doubt be 
reflected in any discussion of creativity.   
 
In previous writing [3, 8] I’ve proposed a new synthesis inspired by 
complexity theory that can potentially reconcile the current differences.  
Here I will quickly review this split, the proposed synthesis, and the 
relevance to the question of creativity. 
 
The first popular airing of the growing 20th century rift between the 
humanities and science is usually attributed to C. P. Snow’s 1959 Rede 
lecture “The Two Cultures.” In this lecture he captures a difference in 
attitude that has only become greater in the intervening years. 
 
Literary intellectuals at one pole – at the other scientists, and as the most 
representative, the physical scientists.  Between the two a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension – sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and 
dislike, but most of all lack of understanding. [9]  
 
The culture of science is rooted in rational Enlightenment values that 
arguably reached their fullest flower in the era of modernity.  Modern 
science posits a noumenal world that allows real progress in its 
understanding. While such understanding may be by way of increasingly 
more accurate models and approximations, it is believed that they approach 
a real and fixed external truth.  
 
Meanwhile the culture of the humanities has extended Hume’s skepticism 
as part of a journey into deep postmodern waters.  Postmodernism, and 
related notions of deconstruction, post-structuralism, and critical theory, 
introduce notoriously elusive, slippery, and overlapping terms and ideas. 
Most adherents would argue that this must be the case because each is not 
so much a position as part of an attitude and an activity; an attitude of 
skepticism and activity that is in the business of destabilizing apparently 
clear and universal propositions. [10] 
 
The modern culture of science stands in stark contrast to the postmodern 
culture of the humanities. 
 
Modernism Postmodernism 
Absolute Relative 
Progress Circulation 
Fixed Random 
Hierarchy Collapse 
Authority Contention 
Truth No Truth 
The Author The Text 
Pro Formalism Anti Formalism 
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Where modernism seeks the absolute postmodernism explores the 
relative.  Even as scientists posit real progress towards understanding the 
fixed laws of the universe, those in the humanities emphasize the circulation 
of constructed cultural realities that are ultimately unanchored traces 
drifting randomly.  
 
The modernist culture of science has a tendency towards the hierarchical, 
expressed, for example, as taxonomical systems of categories and 
reductionist research methods.  The postmodern culture of the humanities 
seeks to collapse hierarchies.  This can be seen in the arts, for example, 
with the leveling of high art and low art, the ironic appropriation of both, 
and the celebration of arbitrary cross-cultural mash-ups. While it provides 
venues for conceptual competition, the culture of science creates and 
embraces authority both in terms of expert practitioners and totalizing 
theories.  The culture of the humanities embraces never-ending contention 
through deconstruction and other post-structural strategies.  It tends to 
view authority as a function of (political) power rather than meaningful 
expertise. 
 
Ultimately this leads to a state of affairs where the culture of science 
expresses a modern optimism that Truth is within the reach.  And the 
culture of the humanities takes the opposite position; a postmodern 
pessimism that no single truth can ever be arrived at because the very 
notion is absurd.  At best, one can be aware of a multiplicity of equally valid, 
equally constructed, differing truths. 
 
At the extreme postmodernism reduces the entire Enlightenment/scientific 
program to mere social construction, no better, certain, or important than 
the “mythologies” of other cultures now or in other times. [11, 12] 
 
IV. Complexism 
 
Without any specific commitment to literal Hegelian philosophy, 
complexism’s reconciliation of modernism and postmodernism can be best 
understood as the third stage in a thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. As a 
paradigm for the arts and humanities complexism is informed by 
contemporary science, but is put into practice as a form of qualitative 
cultural study. 
 
Complexism is shown here as a point-by-point synthesis that in its totality 
suggests a new paradigm.  A synthetic attempt like complexism should be 
expected to take many years to develop, but a first approximation is 
offered in the table and discussion below. 
 
 
Modernism Postmodernism Complexism 
Absolute Relative Distributed 
Progress Circulation Emergence & co-evolution 
Fixed Random Chaotic 
Hierarchy Collapse Connectionist networks 
Authority Contention Feedback 
Truth No Truth 
Statistical truth known to be 
incomplete 
The Author The Text The generative network 
Pro Formalism Anti Formalism 
Form as a public process 
and not privilege 
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Modernity, in both the sciences and in the hands of painters such as Rothko 
and Pollock, reflects Enlightenment values in reaching for the absolute, the 
sublime, and the fixed.  The postmodern attitude rejects the absolute and 
instead posits a multivalent view of arbitrary relative positions that are no 
better than random. Complexism reconciles the absolute with the relative 
by viewing the world as a widely interconnected distributed process.  
Complexism posits processes that are neither fixed nor random, but are 
instead complex feedback systems that often lead to deterministic chaos.  
In the broader culture complexism can nurture a visceral appreciation of 
how the world can be mechanical and yet unpredictable. 
 
Where modernity posits progress, and postmodernity rejects progress for 
multiple contingencies in perpetual circulation, complexism looks towards 
the emergence of co-evolved solutions.  Co-evolved entities achieve real 
progress in the relative context of each other, even while success remains a 
moving target rather than a fixed end-state.  
 
Modernism posits hierarchies, and postmodernism seeks to collapse them.  
Complexism doesn’t erase relationships, but it doesn’t mandate hierarchies 
either.  Complexism emphasizes connectionist models and networks, 
creating systems of peer agents rather than leaders and followers.  
Modernism aspires to absolute truth while postmodernism denies any 
possibility of a single final truth.  Complexism embraces known limits to 
human knowledge [13, 14], but takes seriously the incomplete and 
statistical scientific truths that are achievable. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
As suggested in Figure 5 complexism views both modernism and 
postmodernism as committing similar and yet opposite errors.  Modernism 
moves towards understandable simplicity by creating crystal-like systems 
that are highly structured and highly ordered. Postmodernism moves 
towards understandable simplicity by breaking down and leveling structures 
leading towards something like a cloud of mist.   
 
In trying to gain partial understanding the modernist seeks to avoid the 
disorder that is clearly part of our world, and the postmodernist seeks to 
avoid the order that is also clearly part of our world.  Both modernism and 
postmodernism commit an error of reductionism leading to 
oversimplification and away from an overall understanding of the complex 
systems involved. 
 
Following are three examples of how the complexist view impacts issues 
around creativity. 
 
IVa. Theories of Authorship 
 
The modern scientific community views problems around the notion of 
authorship as being mostly ethical and legalistic in nature.  There are 
discipline specific practices for giving due credit in the ordering of the 
names on research articles.  There are prior art concerns when pursuing 
patents.  And there are notions from the relatively recent open source and 
copyleft movements that seek to modify, weaken, or eliminate the linkage 
between authorship and property rights. 
 
 
  
Figure 6 
 
 
In modernity the focus of attention is on the author who, at the highest 
levels of achievement, engages in a high-stakes battle to create a totalizing 
theory and masterwork.  Those working in highly specialized incremental 
scientific research also don’t consider the reader to have a role in 
authorship per se.  The readers are merely the fortunate beneficiaries of 
the results.  And when modernity reigned supreme over the arts, artists 
were similarly viewed as being singular, potentially heroic, and relatively 
unconcerned with their audience.   
 
From such a view creativity is seen as being solely the domain of the 
author. 
 
In the postmodern humanities this theory of authorship has been 
“problematized.” Poststructural theory diminishes the author to the point 
of figurative “death.”  What is seen as important is the text and the way it 
can be deconstructed by the reader yielding new, multiple, and possibly 
contradictory meanings. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Given such a view the creativity of the author is of less interest than the 
creativity of the reader.  It’s the reader who creates the meaning(s) of the 
text, and thus it’s the reader who must exercise creativity in the practice of 
close reading, i.e. deconstruction. 
 
Relative to complexism both modernism and postmodernism commit an 
error of reductionism leading to misleading oversimplification.  One 
eliminates the reader and the other eliminates the author.  The complexist 
view includes the author, the reader, and the text as all being essential.  
 
From a systems view it becomes obvious that each individual is both a 
reader and a writer.  This creates large networks of author/readers 
connected by flowing texts and feedback loops 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
This suggests that any complexity-based account of creativity has to not 
only consider the brain function of the author, but also the social context 
of the creative activity, and the “inputs” to the author prior to a given 
creation.  Of special interest is the nonlinear amplification and modification 
of creative ideas by readers who go on to contribute to feedback loops. 
 
IVb. Theories of Progress 
 
Discussions of creativity typically stipulate that a creative act must yield 
something new that is of value.  Creativity is thus seen as contributing to 
progress in that it helps to move people to some kind of new and improved 
state. 
 
And so too modern science is viewed as offering real progress as old 
theories are replaced by new theories offering more in the way of 
explanation and prediction. 
 
In the postmodern humanities progress is viewed with extreme skepticism. 
The preference in the humanities is to recognize a plurality of theories in 
perpetual circulation.  Discourse is always viewed as an exercise in 
(political) power as much as anything, and there is no fixed origin from 
which progress can be measured. 
 
The clear challenge related to a discussion of creativity is the following.  
Any account of creativity that includes real progress as a definitional 
prerequisite will immediately run into trouble when considered by those 
steeped in the culture of the postmodern humanities. 
 
Complexity theory can offer the process of evolution, and especially 
coevolution, as a way out of this dilemma.  In biology coevolution refers to 
the way a given adaptation in one species will occur as a response to an 
adaptation in another species sharing the same ecosystem.  This can 
sometimes lead to a symbiotic relationship, or it can also result in a sort of 
“arms race” among predator and prey or species competing for common 
resources.   
 
In the broadest view a given genetic adaptation never represents absolute 
progress.  Adaptations can only represent progress relative to a given 
environment.  In a similar way creativity need not be viewed as contributing 
something of absolute value. Instead creativity can be viewed as 
contributing something of value in the relative context of the particular 
society and situation.  This reconciles the modernist requirement that 
creativity produce something of value while also allowing postmodern 
skepticism towards absolute value. 
 
IVc. Complex Aesthetic Measures and Evolutionary Algorithms 
 
One implication of the above is that aesthetic evaluation is relativistic but 
not arbitrary.  Within a given society over time, or across societies at a 
given time, aesthetic differences arise from a context, and co-evolution 
dominates rather than some unchanging standard of aesthetic quality.  
Indeed definitions and the implied theories of art itself have changed over 
time.   
 
This makes the construction of an automatic function to evaluate aesthetics 
fitness and produce an aesthetic measure very difficult unless some deeper 
and higher level principle can be found.  In this regard a commonly cited 
component of proposed universal aesthetic measures is “complexity.”  But 
without further specification the term is ambiguous.   
 
In earlier papers I’ve discussed some measures of complexity and why they 
do not correspond well with what is meant by complexity in contemporary 
scientific studies of complex systems.  A first meaning is that from 
information theory where complexity is inversely proportional to the 
degree to which a signal (i.e. a collection of symbols) can be compressed 
without information loss. [15, 16]   A second meaning is that complexity is 
inversely proportional to the degree to which an algorithm that produces a 
given output can be compressed without output loss. [17-19] 
 
Both definitions end up assigning the highest complexity to random data, in 
the first case considering the compression of the data itself, and in the 
second an algorithm to produce the data.  While such measures have their 
place, they do not correspond well with our everyday sense of complexity 
or complexity in art.  
 
For example, such views would imply that a digital image of the Mona Lisa 
could be made increasingly more complex by randomizing more and more 
of its pixels.  In actual human experience all images of random pixels are 
essentially the same, and it is the structure within the Mona Lisa that 
contributes to its complexity. What we would like is something akin to a 
measure of engagement. I.e. given a system of a great many parts, how 
much comprehensible variation is in the holistic result. 
 
If a universal measure of complexity is to be used as part of an aesthetic 
measure it should probably correspond to something more like Gell-Mann’s 
proposed “effective complexity” measure.  Artists working in all forms have 
an intuitive understanding that an effective piece needs regularity to not 
lose the audience to confusion, but also surprise to not lose the audience 
to boredom.  This is analogous to the balance of order and disorder that is 
referred to as “complexity” in complexity science. 
   
Figure 9 
As a practical matter being able to measure aesthetic quality will be an 
important component of computational creativity as applied to art.  For 
example, in the field it’s well understood that evolutionary systems can be 
effectively applied to the creation of art.  The components of such a system 
include (1) the ability to encode instructions for an artwork in a genetic 
data structure as genotype, (2) the ability to express the piece as 
phenotype, (3) the ability to add variation to the gene pool via operations 
such as mutation and crossover, and (4) the ability to assess fitness in a 
population to enforce “survival of the fittest.”  Of these four components 
only the first three are essentially solved problems in generative art.  
 
A measure of aesthetic quality would greatly contribute to, or serve as, a 
fitness function in an evolutionary art system.  As it now stands human 
judgment is “in the loop” and evolutionary art systems cannot freely iterate 
for thousands of generations across large populations the way genetic 
algorithms can when applied to other kinds of problems.   
 
Getting the human “out of the loop” in an evolutionary art system would 
be a step forward in art-oriented computational creativity.  Lest the point 
above be lost, using compressibility alone as a measure of complexity 
towards an aesthetic measure is probably mistaken, and a measure of 
effective complexity seems closer to the aesthetic judgments humans make. 
 
V. What is computational creativity? 
 
From my point of view thinking about computational creativity inevitably 
rests upon some arguably larger questions that remain closer to mystery 
than not.  One of the things art on the cutting edge does well is to raise the 
right questions without necessarily answering them.  Acting as an artist I 
feel free to explore the hypothetical in a way that would be considered 
speculative, reckless, and irresponsible in the sciences or humanities. 
I’ve always viewed my work in the arts as a sort of “experimental 
philosophy” where philosophical speculation can be thrown into the 
physical world to see how well it fares and what new ideas it may lead to.  
In this spirit, here are questions and speculative propositions I’m currently 
pursuing in my work. 
 
(1) – Aesthetic measures, if possible at all, will be very complicated because they 
will have to involve a combination of factors such as effective complexity, design 
principles, psychological models, and a matrix of social context factors. 
 
(2) – The question of creativity is difficult for many of the same reasons that the 
question of intelligence is difficult. 
 
At one time the notion of animal intelligence was viewed as absurd. 
Even now the intelligence gap between man and other animals is 
apparently so broad that some assume they are essentially different. 
 
Is it the case that animals are, in fact, not only intelligent but also 
creative? 
 
If intelligent machines are possible can machines be creative in a 
similar way, or with a similar meaning? 
 
(3) – Computational creativity is difficult because we don’t yet understand 
consciousness and the related phenomena of self-awareness and the experience, 
of qualia. 
 
 Is unconscious creativity possible? 
 
 Is conscious creativity possible? 
 
 Are non-neural systems unconscious or something else? 
 
 (4) – The essential aspects of consciousness, the experience of qualia and self-
awareness, remain a mystery that cannot be made irrelevant by attempts to 
explain or define them away.  Here is my tentative position: 
 
Consciousness is more an observer than an actor. 
 
Most mental activities and associated actions are already in motion before, 
if ever, becoming conscious. 
 
Consciousness as purely an observer without any ability to take action 
seems unlikely.  (e.g. What competitive advantage would entirely passive 
consciousness provide in the context of evolution?) 
 
Consciousness is related to feedback at the highest neurological levels. 
 
In the above model creativity then involves both the unconscious and 
conscious. 
 
(5) - Creativity isn’t as special as some might think.  All complex adaptive systems 
are creative.  All human forms of creativity, including creativity in the arts, are 
much more similar than not. 
 
Complex adaptive systems are those complex systems that both sense the 
changing nature of their surroundings and take actions to maintain their 
existential integrity.  These adaptive actions are examples of creativity.  In 
lower life forms the adaptation, intelligence, and creativity involved may be 
quite basic.  But they exhibit adaptation, intelligence, and creativity 
nevertheless. 
 
At the human level maintaining one’s existential integrity involves congruity 
with social expectations, and creativity is always judged relative to a social 
context.  Here social context can also be thought of as culture.  Creativity 
in the arts is especially tied to culture, as its practical function is minimal. 
 
(6) – To the extent a computer can be considered a complex adaptive system it 
can also be considered creative.  
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